ruling out all consideration of an end

Power, by definition, is only a means; or to put it better, to possess a power is simply to possess means of action which exceed the very limited force that a single individual has at his disposal. But power-seeking, owing to its essential incapacity to seize hold of its object, rules out all consideration of an end, and finally comes, through an inevitable reversal, to take the place of all ends. It is this reversal of the relationship between means and end, it is this fundamental folly that accounts for all that is senseless and bloody right through history. Human history is simply the history of the servitude which makes men — oppressors and oppressed alike — the plaything of the instruments of domination they themselves have manufactured, and thus reduces living humanity to being the chattel of inanimate chattels.

Weil, Analysis of Oppression

Freedom as they know it

People have so manipulated the concept of freedom that it finally boils down to the right of the stronger and richer to take from the weaker and poorer whatever they still have. Attempts to change this are seen as shameful intrusions into the realm of the very individuality that by the logic of that freedom has dissolved into an administered void. But the objective spirit of language knows better. German and English reserve the word ‘free’ for things and services which cost nothing. Aside from a critique of political economy, this bears witness to the unfreedom posited in the exchange relationship itself; there is no freedom as long as everything has its price, and in reified society things exempted from the price mechanism exist only as pitiful rudiments. On closer inspection they too are usually found to have their price, and to be handouts with commodities or at least with domination: parks make prisons more endurable to those not in them. For people with a free, spontaneous, serene and nonchalant temper, however, for those who derive freedom as a privilege from unfreedom, language holds ready an apposite name: that of impudence.

Adorno, Messages in a Bottle §3

the nothingness of things

... we can tell those who assert the truth and certainty of the reality of sense-objects that they should go back to the most elementary school of wisdom, viz. the ancient Eleusinian Mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, and that they have still to learn the secret meaning of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine. For he who is initiated into these Mysteries not only comes to doubt the being of sensuous things, but to despair of it; in part he brings about the nothingness of such things himself in his dealings with them, and in part he sees them reduce themselves to nothingness. Even the animals are not shut out from this wisdom but, on the contrary, show themselves to be most profoundly initiated into it; for they do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to without ceremony and eat them up. And all Nature, like the animals, celebrates these open Mysteries which teach the truth about sensuous things.

Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit  ¶109

no longer allowed

In truth, Habit is a violent and treacherous schoolteacher. Gradually and stealthily she slides her authoritative foot into us; then, having by this gentle and humble beginning planted it firmly within us, helped by time she later discloses an angry tyrannous countenance, against which we are no longer allowed even to lift up our eyes.

Montaigne, On Habit

the speed at which a ship is going

The more clearly you become conscious of the frailty, vanity and dream-like quality of all things, the more clearly will you also become conscious of the eternity of your own inner being; because it is only in contrast to this that the aforesaid quality of things becomes evident, just as you perceive the speed at which a ship is going only when looking at the motionless shore, not when looking into the ship itself.

Schopenhauer, On the Indestructibility of our Essential Being by Death 5

arbitrarily

Education should be approached with this goal in mind: ‘How can I personally follow the gods always, and how can I adapt to God’s government, and so be free?’ Freedom, you see, is having events go in accordance with our will, never contrary to it.

Well – is freedom the same as madness? Of course not. Madness and freedom are poles apart. ‘But I want my wishes realized, never mind the reason behind them.’ Now, that’s madness, that’s insanity. Freedom is something good and valuable; to arbitrarily wish for things to happen that arbitrarily seem to you best is not good, it’s disgraceful.

Epictetus. Discourses I.12.8-12

intense dislike

I can only feel intense dislike for muddled thinkers who confusedly demand all rights for the individual. An individual’s limit is not represented simply by the rights of another individual but even more by rights of the masses. We are all inextricably bound up with the masses, participating in their innermost sufferings and their victories. And in our innermost being, we form part of a living group —though we are no less alone, for all that, when things go wrong.

Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche

not even a person

What I must know is whether you are indeed one of those creatures in the lowest grade of mentality and even of charm, one of those contemptible creatures who are incapable of foregoing a pleasure. And if you are such, how could anyone love you, for you are not even a person, a clearly defined entity, imperfect but at least perfectible. You are a formless water that will trickle down any slope that offers itself, a fish devoid of memory, incapable of thought, which all its life long in its aquarium will continue to dash itself a hundred times a day against a wall of glass, always mistaking it for water. Do you realise that your answer will have the effect — I won't say of making me cease loving you immediately, of course, but of making you less attractive in my eyes when I realise that you are not a person, that you are beneath everything in the world and incapable of raising yourself one inch higher?

Proust, Swanns Way, "Swann in Love"

enough

… it is sometimes enough to make us love a woman that she should look on us with contempt and that we should think that she can never be ours, as sometimes, too, it is enough that she should look on us kindly, and that we should think of her as almost ours already.

Proust, Swann's Way, "Combray"

a satisfaction which must be left to itself

Fear of the truth may lead consciousness to hide, from itself and others, behind the pretension that its burning zeal for truth makes it difficult or even impossible to find any other truth but the unique truth of vanity – that of being at any rate cleverer than any thoughts that one gets by oneself or from others. This sort of conceit, which understands how to belittle every truth and turn away from it back into itself, and gloats over this, its own private understanding, which always knows how to dissipate every possible thought, and to find, instead of all the content, merely the barren Ego – this is a satisfaction which must be left to itself; for it flees from the universal and seeks only an isolated existence on its own account.

Hegel, Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirt (¶80)

dominate

When the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the growth rate of the economy (as it did through much of history until the nineteenth century and as is likely to be the case again in the twenty-first century), then it logically follows that inherited wealth grows faster than output and income. People with inherited wealth need save only a portion of their income from capital to see that capital grow more quickly than the economy as a whole. Under such conditions, it is almost inevitable that inherited wealth will dominate wealth amassed from a lifetime’s labor by a wide margin, and the concentration of capital will attain extremely high levels—levels potentially incompatible with the meritocratic values and principles of social justice fundamental to modern democratic societies. 

Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014: 26)

utilitarian blue

When in the distance there's nothing but family and fortune making, the world seems to wither up, the blinds are closed; but what else? To make a mark in history, become an exception, tip the evolutionary scale, walk with a sense of import and justification, in short, to struggle to become something of significance – what a laugh! Significance is irrelevant and opinion is inculcated by the media, or never rises above what the subconscious inherits from the family. Policy is in the hands of business, academia is controlled by sycophants, liberty is limited by the available funds. All that is left of culture is an expensive distraction from suffering, or, worse, a distraction from boredom. And most saddening of all, appreciation has become a function of selfishness, no longer an act of admiration or respect but simply one of want and consumption. To the ancient Greeks the purpose of life was happiness, but happiness is bandied around by so many hawkers that counterfeits are the rule.

And why? Because it all increases marginal utility?

critique

The only critique of a philosophy that is possible and that proves something, namely trying to see whether one can live in accordance with it, has never been taught at universities: all that has ever been taught is a critique of words by means of other words.  

Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as educator §8

at best

The impracticality of a psychology restricted to self-observation is shown by our inability to imagine how such a scientist could qualify as a pedagogue, psychiatrist, or applied psychologist. Unless one can use his introspective skill he can only meditate upon his own thoughts and feelings, and can only become what the practical psychologist often calls a "compulsive neurotic" or, at best, a philosophical thinker. Most of us feel that self-knowledge is worth the effort only when we can use it to understand, control, or "help" others – as we so often rationalize our intent to control.

Otto Rank, Psychology and the Soul (1950: 8)

What one can promise

One can promise actions, but not feel­ings, for the latter are involuntary. He who promises to love for­ ever or hate forever or be forever faithful to someone is promising something that is not in his power. He can, however, promise those actions that are usually the consequence of love, hatred, or faithfulness, but that can also spring from other motives: for there are several paths and motives to an action. A promise to love someone forever, then, means, "As long as I love you I will render unto you the actions of love; if I no longer love you, you will continue to receive the same actions from me, if for other mo­tives." Thus the illusion remains in the minds of one's fellow men that the love is unchanged and still the same.
One is promising that the semblance of love will endure, then, when without self-deception one vows everlasting love. 

Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 58

more dangerous

Socrates considered that to delude oneself that one possesses a virtue one does not possess is an illness bordering on madness: and such a delusion is certainly more dangerous than the opposite illusion of being the victim of a fault or a vice. For in the latter case it is at any rate possible one will become better; the former de­lusion, however, makes a man or an age daily worse – which in the present instance means more unjust. 

Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life §6

the most unjust condition in the world

think of a man tossed and torn by a powerful passion for a woman or a great thought: how his world is changed! Glancing backwards he feels blind, listening sideways he hears what is foreign as a dull meaningless sound; what he perceives at all he has never perceived so before, so tangibly near, coloured, full of sound and light as though he were apprehending it with all his senses at once. All evaluations are changed and devalued; there is so much he can no longer value because he can hardly feel it: he asks himself whether he has been fooled the whole time by alien words and alien opinions; he is astonished that his memory so tirelessly runs in circles and is yet too weak and too tired to leap even once out of this circle. It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings, a little living whirlpool in a dead sea of night and forgetting …

Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life §1

self-evident

All theology and its opposition aside, it is self-evident that the world is not good and not evil, let alone the best or the worst, and that these concepts "good" and "evil" make sense only in refer­ence to men. Perhaps even there, as they are generally used, they are not justified: we must in every case dispense with both the reviling and the glorifying view of the world. 

Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human 28

what kind of thing

With all the things that attract you or that are useful or that are appreciated remember to say what kind of thing it is, starting from the smallest things. If you are fond of a jug, say, "I am fond of a jug"; for if it gets broken, you will not be upset. If you kiss your child or wife, say that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be upset. 

The Enchiridion Ch. 3

Fear and love

– Fear has furthered the universal knowl­edge of humanity more than love, for fear wants to discern who the other person is, what he can do and what he wants: to deceive oneself here would mean danger and disadvantage. Inversely, love has a secret impulse to see in the other as much of the beautiful as possible or to elevate the other as high as possible: for love to deceive itself here would mean pleasure and advantage – and so it does. 

Nietzsche, The Dawn 309

Stoical

–There is a serenity the Stoic possesses whenever he feels constricted by the duties he has prescribed for his way of life; he takes pleasure in himself as the ruler. 

Nietzsche, The Dawn 251

The two directions

 If we attempt to examine the mirror in itself, we uncover, finally, nothing but the things upon it. If we want to seize hold of the things, we come up, in the end, with nothing but the mirror. – This is, in the most general terms, the history of knowledge. 

Nietzsche, The Dawn 243

People with misspent lives.

Some are of such material that society may fashion this or that of them: do with them what one will, they will consider themselves content and find no reason to bemoan a misspent life. Others are made of too exceptional a material – it needn't be, for all that, exceptionally fine, but merely uncommon – not to consider they are sure to fare ill unless, as the sole exception, they are able to live in keeping with their sole purpose in life: in all other cases so­ciety will suffer the subsequent damages. For everything that appears to the individual as part of a misspent, failed life, his whole load of despondence, paralysis, malaise, irritability, cov­etousness, he hurls back onto society – and thus there forms around society a bad, stifling atmosphere and, in the most fa­vorable case, a storm cloud. 

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn 213

the philosopher-artist

Something is wrong with the world.– So exclaims the eternal gadfly of those two most impertinent career-seminarists, the classical philosopher and the modern artist. What creator is not driven by the insatiable perception of an existence gone off-kilter, of a world in need of improvement? (Perhaps it is only the blinding vision of the priestly class which exceeds the candour of the creators of systems and the diamond-chislers of insight in their passion for edification.) These visionaries – and it is indeed their inflated sense of vision which impels them – have been graced with an endless reserve of stamina, allowing them to dip more frequently than most into the blather of criticism and unfulfilled desires that ceaselessly rages below the banal language of every-day living, as fodder for a system of impressive manoeuvres.

Perhaps, one could say, there are some who attempt to capture and reflect the wonderful things in life, the most harmonious of concordances or the most accidental of beauties, and put this positivity into the world, as a monument. Ha! Artists no longer, mere craftsmen, condemned to languish in the factory-houses of "decorative arts." The successful modern artist has become as much of a system builder as the classical philosopher, both hanging their perceptions in the esoteric veil of principles. Creation has become nothing but an edifying flourish, an inside joke, dependent for its success upon the prestige of those who "get it." A recourse to prestige; what statement of knowledge is not undermined by its own backwards movement? A backwards movement made all the more insidious by the very fact that the trumpets which accompany it blare the endless ditty of edification - even if the goal is no longer moral cohesion or "happiness" but merely awareness.

the tip of the triangle

The profiteers of limited resources have no greater interest than sustaining demand for that resource: the scarcer it is, the more labour that goes into refining it for consumption, the higher its market price, and the more profit that can be siphoned into the off-shore accounts of the 1% (of course, including those loyal servants in the civil service who have made it their prerogative to convince the people that if only we keep doing what we've been doing, if only we milk the honey out of our inheritance – no matter how caked in the rust of our primitive selves' fear it may be - if only we play the part, then, ultimately, will we rest assured of security and salvation - maybe not for all, but at least for those who have made themselves deserving of control). It would seem that innovation and advancement – evolution, dare the word be uttered– is no less stifled by the weak, sick, and the last than it is by the strong, proud, and the first.

justice & freedom

Without having anything against jus­tice, one may be allowed to point out that the word conceals the profound truth of its contrary, which is precisely freedom. Under the mask of justice, it is true that general freedom takes on the lackluster and neutral appearance of existence subjected to the necessities: if anything, it is a narrowing of lim­its to what is most just; it is not a dangerous breaking-loose, a meaning that the word has lost. It is a guarantee against the risk of servitude, not a will to assume those risks without which there is no freedom.

Bataille, The Accursed Share Vol. 1 (38)

existence itself as a punishment

People of diligence and goodwill, lend a hand in the one work of eradicating from the face of the earth the concept of punishment, which has overrun the whole world! There is no more noxious weed! Nor only has it been implanted into the consequences of our modes of behaviour – and how horrible and repulsive to reason this alone is: to interpret cause and effect as cause and punishment! – but they've gone further still and, with this infamous art of interpreting the concept of punishment, they have robbed of its innocence the whole, pure contingency of events. Indeed, they have driven this madness to such an ex­treme as to bid us experience existence itself as a punishment­ – it is as if, heretofore, the phantasms of jailers and hangmen had been conducting the education of the human race. 

Nietzsche, Dawn 13

the gates of solitude

I hold this to be the highest task of a bond between two people: that each should stand guard over the solitude of the other. For, if it lies in the nature of indifference and of the crowd to recognize no solitude, then love and friendship are there for the purpose of continually providing the opportunity for solitude. And only those are the true sharings which rhythmically interrupt periods of deep isolation . . . .

It is a question in marriage, to my feeling, not of creating a quick community of spirit by tearing down and destroying all boundaries, but rather a good marriage is that in which each appoints the other guardian of his solitude, and shows him this confidence, the greatest in his power to bestow. A togetherness between two people is an impossibility, and where it seems, nevertheless, to exist, it is a narrowing, a reciprocal agreement which robs either one party or both of his fullest freedom and development. But, once the realization is accepted that even between the closest human beings infinite distances continue to exist, a wonderful living side by side can grow up, if they succeed in loving the distance between them which makes it possible for each to see the other whole and against a wide sky! 

Therefore this too must be the standard for rejection or choice: whether one is willing to stand guard over the solitude of a person and whether one is inclined to set this same person at the gate of one's own solitude, of which he learns only through that which steps, festively clothed, out of the great darkness. -

from On Love and Other Difficulties, 33-4

one may read about the matter in his biography

"a pessimist, a repudiator of God and of the world, who makes a halt at morality — who assents to morality, and plays the flute to laede-neminem morals, what? Is that really — a pessimist?"

Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil, 186.